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Payne v. Tennessee:

Reexamining the

Admissibility of Victim Impact Evidence
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Payne v. Tennessee,' the United States Supreme Court held that
the Eighth Amendment was not a "per se bar" to the admissibility of
victim impact evidence in the sentencing phase, of a capital trial.2 A jury
convicted Pervis Tyrone Payne, petitioner, of two counts of first degree
murder and one count of first degree assault with intent to murder, and
sentenced Payne to death. Payne appealed the death sentence on grounds
that allowing a capital sentencing jury to consider victim impact evidence
violated the Eighth Amendments and the Supreme Court of Tennessee
affirmed." The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and
affirmed. 5
The Supreme Court also held that courts are not constrained to adhere
blindly to the doctrine of stare decisis when decisions are unworkable and
poorly reasoned. However, this Casenote will address only the issue of
victim impact evidence by exploring the majority's analysis and the concurring opinions. In addition, it will criticize the opinion from the perspective of Justice Stevens' dissent.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND

Prior to Payne, several capital defendants successfully challenged the
admissibility of victim impact evidence under the Eighth Amendment. In
Booth v. Maryland,7 the Supreme Court, interpreting the Eighth Amendment, invalidated that portion of a Maryland statute requiring the
presentence report in all felony cases to include a victim impact statement ("VIS") outlining the ramifications of the crime upon the victim
and the victim's family. The Eighth Amendment states that "[e]xcessive
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bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."' The VIS at issue not only depicted the
characteristics of the victim and the repercussions of the crime on the
family, but also described the family's personal characterization of defendant and the crime. 10
In South Carolina v. Gathers," decided two years later, the court expanded the scope of Booth to exclude from evidence a prosecutor's comments to the sentencing jury about the victim's personal qualities.12 However, Payne overruled both of these decisions.
III.
A.

THE CASE

The Facts and ProceduralHistory

Payne's victims, twenty-eight year old Charisse Christopher, her two
year old daughter Lacie, and her three year old son Nicholas, lived in an
apartment across the hall from Payne's girlfriend, Bobbie Thomas, in
Tennessee. After spending part of the day drinking beer and injecting
cocaine, Payne went to the apartment building in anticipation of Thomas'
return from an out-of-state visit with her mother. After discovering that
Thomas had not returned, Payne entered Charisse's apartment and made
sexual advances toward her. Payne became violent when Charisse refused
his advances and a neighbor who heard Charisse's screams phoned the
13
police.

Police officers encountered Payne covered with blood and running out
of the building, but were unable to apprehend him. Inside the kitchen of
the apartment, they found Charisse's body, with eighty-four knife
wounds, and Lacie's body, also with numerous knife wounds. The murder
weapon, a butcher knife, was at Lacie's feet and Payne's baseball cap was
snapped around her arm. Despite stab wounds that penetrated Nicholas'
entire body from front to back, he survived
after extensive surgery. Police
14
apprehended Payne later that day.
Payne maintained his innocence at trial in spite of overwhelming evidence against him. Nevertheless, the jury found Payne guilty on all
counts.1 5,
During the sentencing phase of the trial, Payne presented the testimony of his parents and Thomas who stated, in general, that the crimes
9. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
10. 482 U.S. at 502.
11. 490 U.S. 805 (1989), overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991).

12., 111 S. Ct. at 2604.
13. Id. at 2601.
14. Id. at 2601-02.
15. Id. at 2602.
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he had been convicted of were inconsistent with his character. Moreover,
Thomas testified that her children had grown very attached to Payne and
would miss him. Payne also introduced the testimony of Dr. John T. Huston, a clinical psychologist, who testified that Payne's score on an IQ test
indicated he was mentally handicapped. Dr. Huston stated that Payne
was the most well-behaved prisoner he had ever met.'
The prosecution called Charisse's mother, Mary Zvolanek, to take the
stand. Zvolanek described how much Nicholas missed his mother and sister, and, due to his inability to comprehend the concept of death, his
continuing concern for his sister's well-being. During closing arguments in
the sentencing phase, the State elaborated on the enduring effects of the
murders upon the child.1 7 The jury returned a sentence of death on the
murder counts and the Supreme Court of Tennessee affirmed. 8 The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. 1"
B. The Supreme Court's Opinion
Eighth Amendment Challenge. In addressing Payne's claim that
admitting victim, impact evidence in the sentencing phase of a capital
trial violated the Eighth Amendment, the Supreme Court overruled its
holdings in Booth and Gathers." The court held that the Eighth Amendment did not act as a "per se bar," but that a case by case determination
should be made to decide whether evidence about the victim and the
emotional impact of the crime on the victim's family is relevant and
21
within the bounds of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.
Assessment of Harm. The court reasoned that a demonstration of
the harm caused by the defendant is an indispensable focus of criminal
law.2 2 A determination of resultant harm is necessary to establish the
crime with which the state will charge defendant as well as the sentence it
will impose.2 3 The victim impact evidence is designed to reflect the harm
caused by a defendant, and is, therefore, a relevant factor in establishing
the blameworthiness of a defendant.24 Thus, instead of producing an
emotional, unreasoned imposition of the death penalty, victim impact evidence simply is another legitimate way in which to educate the jury about
16.
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the harm caused by a crime." As Justice, O'Connor noted in her concurring opinion, the brief comment Charisse Christopher's mother made in
this case could not "inflame [the jury's] passions" any more than the facts
of the crime did.1
Range of Admissible Evidence. Regardless of the predominant
sentencing philosophy at any given time, sentencing authorities always
have been permitted to consider a broad range of relevant evidence.2 7 In
Gregg v. Georgia,'2 decided prior to Booth, the court refused to impose
restrictions on evidence the State could offer at a presentence hearing in
a capital case as long as the evidence did not prejudice defendant.29 The
court's reluctance was due, in part, to its desire to provide as much relevant information as possible to juries making sentencing decisions."0 Although Gregg did not involve the production of victim impact evidence,
the court relied on Gregg to illustrate the wide range of evidence traditionally permitted at presentence hearings in capital cases.
Misinterpretation of Precedent. Although courts are required to
treat capital defendants as "uniquely individual human beings,"' 1 the
Court held that Booth misread precedent by suggesting that a defendant
is entitled to that consideration completely separate from the crime he or
she committed. 2 Rather, justice requires that the circumstances surrounding the crime be considered in conjunction with defendant's character and disposition.3
Comparative Judgments. Just as the capital defendant may present evidence relating to his or her own personal circumstances, the state
should be permitted to introduce evidence about the victim's life.3 It
would be innately unfair to allow the defense to introduce evidence about
defendant's character and the effect a sentence would have on his or her
family without permitting the prosecution to introduce corresponding evidence about the victim. 3
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 2608.
Id. at 2612 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 2606.
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Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (citation omitted).
111 S. Ct. at 2607.
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Payne also challenged the admissibility of victim impact evidence by
reiterating a concern articulated in Booth.8 ' Payne argued that this type
of evidence allows, and perhaps encourages, juries to levy heavier punishments against defendants whose victims contributed more to society than
those whose victims were less of an asset.8 7 The American criminal justice
system does not allow such a distinction.3
However, the Court asserted that rather than encouraging "comparative judgments," victim impact evidence reflects the victim's uniqueness
as an individual.3 To illustrate its point, the Court referred to Gathers,
in which the victim was a mentally impaired, jobless, religious fanatic.
Although arguably not a great asset to the community, he was still a victim of murder.40 Justice O'Connor agreed with the majority that victim
impact evidence serves "to remind the jury that the person whose life was
taken was a unique human being.' 1 Justice O'Connor added that any
remark by a prosecutor or a witness that renders the sentencing process
unfair may be challenged by defendant under the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 2 Thus, while the Court recognized that a
comparison of victims based on their perceived value to society would be
improper, it concluded that victim impact evidence is not designed to effectuate that result.
Rejection of the Booth Analysis. The Court rejected the reasoning in Booth that victim impact evidence should be excluded since defendant likely cannot rebut it without diverting the emphasis of the sentencing hearing from defendant to the victim.' Not only was the Court in
Booth concerned with the tactical problem inherent in attacking victim
impact evidence in the presence of a jury, the Court was also concerned
that it might have the effect of placing the victim on trial."
Without actually addressing these issues in Payne, the Court justified
the admission of victim impact evidence partly on grounds that the prosecution often presents the evidence to the jury prior to sentencing in the
trial's guilt phase. 5 Justice Souter elaborated on this point in his concurring opinion. A jury that hears evidence in the guilt phase of a trial will
36.

Id. at 2607.
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Id.
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Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 506 n.8 (1987).

39. 111 S. Ct. at 2607.
40. Id.
41.
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Id. at 2611 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 2612 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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482 U.S. at 506-07.
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remember it in the sentencing phase as well.' Changing the rules to comply with Booth and provide consistency throughout the entire trial might
deprive jurors of information about the crime that is essential to a rea47
soned decision.

IV.

ANALYSIS

The Supreme Court made an unexpected decision by overruling Booth
only two years after broadening its scope in Gathers. The decision in
Payne was especially surprising in light of the recent origin of victim impact evidence, which first appeared in the court's jurisprudence in
Booth."" The dissenting opinions in Payne largely mirrored concerns expressed by the majority in Booth as reasons to exclude this type of evidence at the sentencing phase of a capital trial.
A.

A Propelling Force

Groups advocating victims' rights have been a strong impetus behind
recent decisions like Payne."9 These groups espouse victims' participation
in court proceedings because of a belief that the criminal justice system
unduly protects the accused at the expense of the accuser.50 Indeed, Stevens' dissent in Payne criticizes the majority for bowing to such political
pressures, forces that he argues have no place in reasoned judicial
analysis."
B.

The Victim on Trial

Retribution and the deterrence of prospective offenders are two important goals of capital punishment in the American judicial system. 2 The
death penalty provides an outlet for expression of social outrage at certain crimes and simultaneously promotes stability within society.5 3 Nonetheless, the sentencing determination must reflect the blameworthiness of
defendant as a unique person. 5 4 Rather than accomplishing this goal, victim impact evidence shifts the focus from defendant to the victim. Since
defendants must be allowed to rebut evidence presented by the state, the
46. Id. at 2617 (Souter, J., concurring).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 2626 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
49. Georgia Sargeant, Victim Impact Evidence Allowed by Supreme Court in Death
Penalty Hearings, TRIAL, October 1991, at 11.
50. Id.
51. 111 S. Ct. at 2627 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
52. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976).

53. Id.
54. 111 S. Ct. at 2605.
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result is a "mini-trial" on the victim's character." Ignoring for a moment
the tactical problems in attacking the victim's character, the defendant is
able to present evidence to impeach the victim's character, thus distracting the jury from its task of deciding whether capital punishment is appropriate for a particular defendent in the circumstances."
C. Moral Culpability
Courts have firmly established that a jury's sentencing decision must
7
not be arbitrary, but must be based on defendant's personal culpability.'
It logically follows that factors of which defendant was unaware and that
played no part in the decision to kill are improper in making this determination. 8 In Payne the Court concluded that since victim impact evidence is designed to reflect the harm caused by a defendant, and since
resulting harm is an important component of the sentencing process, victim impact evidence is relevant in establishing defendant's blameworthiness." However, merely because such evidence was designed to measure
harm does not necessarily mean that it is within the realm of evidence
relevant to determining harm. Parading bereaved family members in
front of the jury injects emotion into what should be a reasoned analysis
of moral guilt." Moreover, it is disturbing that uneven application of the
law may result simply because some victims' families possess more "jury
s These are
appeal" than others.0
not the type of distinctions upon which
decisions to impose the death penalty should be based. In the words of
Stevens' dissenting opinion in Payne, victim impact evidence "serves no
purpose other than to encourage jurors to decide in favor of death rather
than life on the basis of their emotions rather than their reason. "62
D. Equal Protection
The majority in Payne contends that victim impact evidence will not
lead to comparison judgments in which defendants whose victims are considered assets to society disproportionately receive sentences of capital
punishment.68 However, when one considers the discrepancy between the
sentence a defendant typically receives when a police officer is killed with
55. 482 U.S. at 507.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 502.

58. Id. at 504.
59. 111 S. Ct. at 2605.
60. Id. at 2625 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
61. Sargeant,.supranote 49, at 14.
62. 111 S. Ct. at 2625 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

63. Id. at 2607.
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the sentence a defendant typically receives when a drug dealer is killed,
the effect of victim impact evidence cannot be denied. Imposing capital
sentences based on victims' positions within the4 community, albeit inadvertent, poses clear equal protection problems.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's decision in Payne has been applauded by victims'
rights' activists nationwide. However, Payne has the potential of transforming defendants into victims themselves. Perhaps the Supreme Court
will consider revisiting the issue of victim impact evidence one final time
to eradicate the serious defects inherent in its decision.
ELIZABETH A. MCLEOD

64. Abraham Abramovsky, Victim Impact Statements Revisited, N.YL.J., March 31,
1992, at 5.

